The harassed decision maker : time pressures, distractions, and the use of evidence by Wright, Peter

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
BOOKSTACKS

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2012 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/harasseddecision134wrig
Faculty Working Papers
THE HARASSED DECISION MAKER:
TIME PRESSURES, DISTRACTIONS,
AND THE USE OF EVIDENCE
Peter Wright
#134
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

FACULTY WORKING PAPERS
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
February 1, 1974
THE HARASSED DECISION MAKER:
TIME PRESSURES, DISTRACTIONS,
AND THE USE OF EVIDENCE
Peter Wright
//134

Abstract
This study was concerned with the dominant simplifying strategies
people use in adapting to difficult information processing environments.
The hypothesis testes was that judges operating under tirae pressure or
distraction would tend to systematically place greater weight on negative
evidence than counterparts in less strainful conditions. Six groups of
subjects were presented five pieces of information to assimilate in
evaluating cars as purchase options. Three groups operatec under varying
tiiae pressure conditions and three groups under varying levels of
distraction. Data usage models assuming disproportionately heavy
weighting of negative evidence provided beat-fits to a substantially
higher number of subjects in the high time pressure and moderate
distraction conditions* Subjects also attended to fewer data dimensions
in these conditions.,

THE HARASSED DECISION MA50SR:
TIME PRESSURES, DISTRACTIONS, AM) THE USE OF EVIDENCE
Peter Wright
Department of business Administration, University of Illinois, ^rbana
Perhaps the most pervasive task people face in everyday life is
trying to use disparate pieces of information to choose among alterna-
tives t consumer goods, investment portfolios, political candidates, etc.
The individual equipped with limited information handling ability must
try to balance his desire to make accurate choices which maximize his
resulting benefits and his equally urgent needs related to the cogni-
tive strains of the decision task Reviews by Slovic and his associates
(Slovic, 1972; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971) suggest some of the
diverse ways judges nay simplify data handling chores. These reviews
also demonstrate that while some structural properties of the avail-
able information have been varied in judgment process research, the
adaptations judges make under high information load have received sur-
prisingly Httle empirical attention.
A decision maker's nee:,? to simplify should become more urgent when
he must operate under a heavy information load. Information load is
generally conceived as the amount of data to be processed per unit of
time. An increase in Information load could therefore result from
either increasing the amount of data with which a person must cope or
decreasing the time available for processing. Amount of data can itself
be increased by either increasing the number of decision-relevant pieces
of evidence or by increasing the total amount of information in the
immediate environment such that the individual becomes distracted.

2High information load is perhaps the rule rather than the exception
for consumers shopping in noisy, crowded, informat ion-packed retail
outlets or managers making decisions under the pressure of deadlines.
iiplifying Strategies
Faced with a decision task of challenging complexity, an indivi-
dual may try to restructure that task into a simpler one. For example,
he can try to defer an impending decision deadline, physically remove
the source of the distraction, ©r move himself to a more peaceful
locale. Even when & person*s ability to control time pressure or inter-
ns
ferenee ase limited, he may still restructure his task by restricting
his attention to certain portions of the incoming data. He may exclude
data about less relevant dimensions from consideration, even though he
would consider those dimensions sufficiently important to input under
less taxing conditions. Or he oiay focus attention on data in certain
regions of each dimension. For example, mult iattribute options
usually offer outcomes which potentially range from highly desirable to
highly undesirable. Pieces of inform the decision maker of the o
positive or negative implications of choosing mi ontion. A person mav
limit his data intake by becoming especially attentive only to data
about possible negative (or positive) outcomes.
In simplifying as proposed, a decision maker accepts some distor-
tloninto his isubje Ly ideal judgment policy. If he ignores entire
dimensions of evidence, he chooses in ignorance of what outcomes to
expect on those dimensions, The dimensions he attends to will
consequently have relatively greater impact on his judgments than they
normally would. If he focuses on negative evidence, he sacrifices

3awareness .of the extent of positive outcomes to be expected, and
vice versa. It would be surprising if these two strategies aren't
used concurrently, i.e.., the harassed decision maker limiting attention
to negative (or positive) evidence on a reduced number of dimensions.
Whether he is more comfortable Ignoring positive or negative
evidence probably depends on the payoff structure of the task.
ftanouse and Hanson (1971} reviewed several streams of research
suggesting that judgmental about ebjec-ts with good and bad attributes
are more heavily influenced by negative data. Explanations for this
"negativity bias** uniformly stress the situational salience of costs
or rewards. For example,, both Webster (1964) and Canavan (1969) found
a negative bias when the decision maker's reward system heavily
penalised hi3 false positive© while ignoring his successes. In many
dec &s Ion tasks, no such well defined, externally imposed payoff
structure exists* Even so,, conditions surrounding the judgment may
ir-duce the* simplifying judge, who feels he must sacrifice some of the
available inputs to ignore . ositive evidence and insure he is
aware of impending negative consequences. One ^uch facilitating
condition may b< t the optlon(s) evaluated possess both positive
and negative features ! ouse, 19 i Other research
suggests a negative bias mi] personal investments
(hence, personal losses) are involved and where the judgmental context
implies final commitment t< chosen option ( Slovic, 1969; Einhorn,
1971). While many judgment contexts fit these requirements, the
consumer car-buying decision was chosen as representative for this studv.

At its extreme , disproportionately heavy weighting of negative
evidence amounts to using a conjunctive strategy (Coombs, I96M
with multiple cutoffs separating negat ve from positive outcomes
(and hence, negative froi 2 evidence.). Discovery of a datum
suggesting rin option doesn't surpass any cutoff results in outright
rejection.. Einhorn (1971) has »ted (but not demonstrated) that .
a conjunctive strategy is an attract ; : Lmplifying procedure relative
to a linear compensatory strategy. While the rationale offered is
plausible, Wright's (1974) results caution that executing a conjunctive
strategy may net Necessarily be viewed as easy by the decision ma^er.
In any case* a person actually using a compensatory strategy aav
temporarily adjust his data treatment so that negative data is accen-
ted without going to the extreme of a strictly noncompensatory
conjunctive rule. Unfortunately, when the judge under observation
makfca «rrors in trans latin em input data to output judgments it
difficult to dii . ;c;sa two cases.
The hypothesis ia that d nately heavy weighting of negative
evidence will occur frequently among ons making the type of judgment
described (personal investment, n< cornea possible, tinal
commitment!} \Xiu&-.r time pressure or when distracted. Under more
leisurely conditions, no evidence will be dominant since
individual utility Lons wi < this hypothesis, mathe-
matical models representing an "unbiased", a "negatively biased", and a
"positively biased" data usage scheme were formulated. All were
variations of the general Ac a compensatory model (Slovic and
Lichtenstetn, 1971):

J(X) « b-,i£i * b,iU + brX* ... b,.X»rV 1 * l f 2 fl .,k CD
where J(X) is an overall (numeric udgment of an option; X. ie a
(numerical} scale value for that option on the jLth dimension? and
b is the weight g: tole. When the judg-
saent is recordei tnd the stimuli expressed as levels
an descriptive scales, numbers are •: -d to the scale points for
entry in this m< The vari . contrasted here concerned only the
scale values on th t nice* e£ Eq. 1,
A?> "'unbiased*' model (where negative end positive evidence is equally
weighted) was represented by assigning the numbers 1 - 7 to the seven
levels along each descriptive dimension. (e.g.
„
"greatly below average"
« lj "greatly above average'" « 7). Two "negative bias" models were used.
In one (Eq.2) the scale values X^ » 1,.»„,7 were trass termed into log Xj.
The effect was that differences between the scale point values increased
tLoniln., the descriptive scales became increasingly negative
(e.g., leg 1 * 0; log 2 ; '' eSOlj log 3 « .&77, . .. , log 6 .778? log 7
.845).
J(X) • bj i >ilog(X i .. -s- b^logCX^), i>0 (2)
Since the desc a used had an "average" midpoint, negative
evidence rftigfc eonstr lenee implying below average
features. Th ve bias*' model transformed only the below
average section of ?o that the effective scale
values were 0, 4. 6.5, a, 9,, 10, 11. The first ''negative bias" model
described (Eq.2) will be labeled ?JEG. and the second NEG
.

Two "positive bias" models were also used. In ?0S (Eq.,,3)
diff ices betwee scale values increase nan linearly as the
scales becone increasingly positive.
JCX) * -b,I X, - X^) - ... -b^.log J, C3)
In Eq« 3. a is bi ry constant set above the highest scale value
(? in this case) so the pred?A- vent remains finitie. PCS-
transformed onl£ the sb< " section of the stimulus scale3
so the effective dcsle values vex % t 5.5, 3 } 12.
Sech o'Z the n fit to the data of individual subjects
ing judgmsnte :rent time pressure or distraction conditions
Finding that substantially more of the "harassed** subjects ;j data
usage processes are best matched by SCS^ or KEG, would be interpreted
&s support for the .hypothesis.
Met hoc
The judgment Task
Subje tons of thirty hypotL car models.
Information on £iv . ributes - was g Lng price,
ease od ccst nd riding comfort.
A pilol erally salient in evaluating
seven-point scales
witl gi ' reatly above
average"; .Ldpeir.t was labeled "average 45
.
The descriptions were
created hat each attribute appeared an approxim?telv equal number
of tiofts and so that each car wc^s a mixture of positive and negative
tributes. This was Loportant since the. models won't discriminate
ry well where the evidence about an option is fairly homogeneous.
Subjects were told the norms implied by the "average*' label referred

7to the class of cars selling for less than $4000, They were asVcd
to treat the availabl s as credible end as constituting their
own beliefs ebout the car
Subjects judged aach i :sod they would
purchase such a car f ion graduatio oa collft
The content was thus ene .. rather than preliminary
screening, and specified m act rather than a evaluation.
In the "'time pressure i wereree orded on a four point
scale ranging from "extremely high probability" to "extremely low
probability". In the "distract ion"study» the scale used to record
judgmst-'. is a sc toint bipolar scale with erdpoints labeled
"likely 11 find "unlihelj '
Time Pressure Treatments
Three variations ae press are were created., tn the "high
tlnCi presi is were- told to make as
siecxirate judj : • • it were also .hat subsequent
tasks awa ey were asked t eed &s rapidly as possible
without sa sing ac< ness of time
pressure, am ipsed ti ton-secant- intervals
or* a visible blaekbi b facts were asked t > 'd the elapsed time
'heir booklet when led. Subjects in the "low time pressure"
(LTP) condition war was to accurately judge the
cars,. Each was told he would (J second? to consider the infor-
mation available and should use the entice period. Only when the end
of e ...' second interval was signaled by the assistant could he
record his judgment &n<i proceed to the next car. The length of a

40 second interval was demonstrated to & tat it offered
plenty of processing ti [n the "undefined t cessure" (DTP)
condition, instructio condition but no
nandatory delib sed. Subjects were told to
proceed at whatever s>ac€ them. After judg-
ctent task j subjects ware as-ed "How much time pressure did you feel
while making your jud; "hey re >n a five point scale
with endpolnts labeled "very much pressure" and "very little pressure".
Distraction Treatments
Distraction 'treatments weren*t crossed with time pressure treat-
ments. Three levels of distraction were created. In all three,
subjects were given an introduction similar to the UTP condition,
an. Lso forwarned that sob > .& would accompany their tas'-
te siwulvite a natural decision environment. In
,
distrac-
tion*" (HD) coj srpt from & radio talk shew
test ion mereials) was played at
a moderately
I In the
"moderate 6.U t at low
volume. In the " . condition, taped background
music from ai • subjects were
vi cars. After
the j-i ' y
%
each was as - did you find the
noise from the tape re snts?*' They
responded on a t i x:led 'Very distract-
ing" ana "not very distracting". In addition, they were asked to
describe any methods the' to ham ractions.

9Subjects
Subjects were 210 male undergraduates enrolled in a business
curriculum and approaching graduation, !ach am randomly assigned
to one of the three tine pressure conditions (final cell size of
forty) or one of the three distraction conditions (final cell siae
of thirty)
.
.suits
'Treatment Val idat ions
Mean tirae-per- judgment recorded by subjects in the HTP condition
was 12. 2 seconds compared with the standard 40 seconds in LTP. Exact
time keeping for subjects in UTP was difficult but expet Its*? ntars*
estimates show an average total time of 10 minutes, or about 20 seconds
per judgment, Time used isn*t the optimal measure of perceived time
pressure though. Mean ratings og perceived time pressure were 6.67,
2.70
v
and: 2.12 for the HXP 4 LTP, a TO treatments respectively. KTP
subjects felt more time pressure than eith the other groups,
which didn*t differ significantly V l 2, 118 d . • < .01}.
Subjects in the distraction conditions wars asked how distracting
they found the extraneous ni In teir task. Means were
4.50, 3.19, and 1.35 for HD, WD, and ID tre.it.war.ts respectively (F »
6. 74 | 2 9 88 d.f*; p < .01). Ntuman-Kucla analysis showed each treat-.
meat differed significantly irom each of the others.
Treatment Effects
For each subject, multiple correlations were computed between his
actual judgments and t! -redicted by the "unbiased" model, the two
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"negative bias" models., and -o "positive- bias" models. For the
last four,, the appropriate transforms were made before the scale
values were entered into the regression. Two values for a- (8 and 50)
were used in Eq„ 3 to see what ee it made. The effect was
minimal and reported results are for a vnelysis at the level of
the individual was moat relevant to the question of simplifying
strategies. For each subject, the model yielding the highest multiple
correlation (H
tljax ) was noted. Tne frequency with which each subject's
strategy was best dewcribed by each model is shown in Table 1„
In computing these frequencies ( X&G^ and NEC. weren't contrasted
against each other but were used alternately. The same holds for POSj
end K)S „ NEGj_ turned out to be virtually interchangeable with NEG^,
snd PCS, for P0S2 . Substitutions yielded only two reclassifications.
Consequently, the relative frequencies shown in Table 1 are for PGS^
and W& and the analysis is for the the data shown. Similar analyses
1
£or fi
£ia3f
frequencies produced by all other model combinations gave
similar results.
The hypothesis was that operating under pronounced time pressure
or distraction would induce a general tendancy among subjects to rely
heavily on negative evidence. Examining first the time pressure effect,
no systematic pattern in the m rig tactics of LTP or UTP subjects is
apparent .All three models provide optimal fits for about the seine
number of subjects. However^ approximately two-thirds of the subjects
operating under high time pressure were best fit by the model assuming
heavy weighting of negative data. An overall chi-squart tes«; gave a
value of K.62 (4 d.f., p <£ .01), Gcinpsring the HTP subjects with the

11
collapsed samples from the other two conditions gave a chi-nqfuare
value of 13.83 (2 d.f., p < .001} » Subjects forced to assimilate
multiple cues under time pressure did Kffer from their counterparts
handling the same information under less pressure.
In the distraction study, the emerging patterns ere somewhat
different. Again, the least strainful condition (LB) produced no
evidence that subjects displayed anything but personal idiosyncracies
in the way they weighted data. Greater frequency of negative bias did
occur when a moderate ie distracting noise surrounded the tas !-.
Sixty percent of the subjects in the MB treatment were best bit by
NEG-« Yet this pattern didn ti t. repeat itself when distractions increased
(ED). Overall ehi-squ&re ani a gave a value of 8.62, with four
degrees of freedom,- p < ..OS. Comparing the moderate distraction group
against the collapsed LD and HB groups gave a ehi-square of 7.30 (2 d.f. t
p< .05).. This analysis offers tentative support for the hypothesised
dependence on negative da rhen distractions placed a strain on attention.
If limiting the nature and amount of the data used is a preferred
tactic for handling l number of separate
dimensions subjects consulted in making their judgments might reflect
this. Consequently* th« iisrabe i [pensions with statistically
signifi (p < .05) regression c its was calculated for each
subject. This gave s of he had been systema-
tically related by the processor t i ? tent. The maximum was
five. Mean number of significant dimension subject was 1.50,
2.35, and 2.0? for the HTi\ LTP, condil Lons, respectively.
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One way analysis-of-variance indicated significant differences between
the three conditions (F • 4.45s 1, 118 d.f.; p< .05), Keumau "uels
analysis showed the HT? group used significantly r dimensions than
the other two groups, which. Jidn.'t differ. In the distraction study,
mean dimensions per subject was ,93, 1.63, and 2.15 for the KD, MD, and
ID groups, respectively. Similar analyses showed the HD subjects used
fewer dimensions than either the MD or IB subjects, and the MD group
fewer then the LD group CF 6.32; 1, 8S d.f.; p < .05),
Just how adequate were any of these models in describing the
strategies subjects used? Frcquant best-fits for KEG, where predicted
would be less meaningful If multiple correlations were low. Mean
multiple correlations for the models are shown in Table 2. After
transforming the multiple correlations via Fisher *s z transform,
separate 3x3 ANGVAs were run. for the tine pressure and distraction
studies. In the time pressure study, the main effects of time pressure
CF « 45.34; 2,118 d e f ; p « .0( id mode'. .36; 2,236 d.f. 5
p < .05) were significant, ar; was the jtteraction (F » SS.23; 4,236 d.f. ;
p <C .001) * The time pressure effect, due to the somewhat lower
correlations in HTP, was anticipated by the precedL- nalysis of
number of significant dimensions per subject. 1 cer&cticn, also
expected froa preceding individual level analyses, was due to higher
correlations for NG£, in HTP vs. the comparably high correlations for
all three models in LTP and UTP.
The repeated-measures ANOVA for the distraction study yielded
significant main effect for distinction <F * 67.62; 2, «B d.f.; p <c .0016
and a significant interaction effect (F « 12.88; 4,176 d.f.; p< .001).
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The models effect
.. <p * 2.32; 2, 176d.£.; n.s.).
The expected interaction was ... the re ;her correlation
of NEGj In the MD
- parable correlations in the other
traction conditions, Thi Etively poor fits generally found in
the high distr
. (
, nanipulation may have
disrupted the subjects*
..-, auch they became erratic.
Hence ths neg, hold for
the overstrain cts, Si
, ion is partially
supported by subj€ c t8 V descriptions of how they coped with
the distractions. ded to repot- frustration and
A3 one final test
. w well © negative bias model did in
•xplalnln t
.
.
,, .
• two c i iompared fco rhe
subje< sst
fit h "
I it condition (.635). The
C0
uodeJs were
1 OT
'
!
' f ' '
'
51
. by
gures for the
The proporl
.
,
»• W«
ars to
.
port the hy oth
. A tei d , p people
te negative evidem-
. he environment discourages
'w* ly P citary tendency to use.
rower attributes in the same circtims »lso lndicati The
• i atcer is pictured aa becominp extremely Alert to
crediting evidence on a few salieat dimensions.

The perspective ta 1 here on how people use evldan
ing alternatives echoes that of Shepard (1964) and Tvers'*y (
emphasizing a -
.
tediate "state of mind" as
tainant of the we Lgh Repea
data weighting policie
Lnst traditional Idea® of a stable utility function die •
weighting schema which consistent noli Sec isles evalti
policy serosa situations. he we gh >es to s
the decision probl In part a function oi stable goals and in ;
a function of immediately salient subgoals. The latter m tine
former under certain circumstances, and vice versa. Tl
interest then becomes identify; e conditio"
deviate from his LmaX "rational" strategy (if such
meaningful) and trying to discover whatever stabi it
manner in which he deviates under those co:
related to information overload, two of wl
study, se« a Ing poin
4 limitation of fitti il
is the remaining an ty aboi : of
models used • . .
conservative interpretation of the n
differential weighting oi negative eviden .••
ora. Wowever, MEG. and NE05 may viewed
noncompensatory conjunctiva tegy. 'Por e:
proposed that If sc, 2 Sticensorates a lost transform

l«i
values on the l« p t «**d« of the equation, it ^av be treated as a
con.iunc.tive ^odel. °"" ?0„ bends the aven ^ore
ahavtvl: n NEO-. , ft might also be seen as a reasonable approximation
to a mult >fP stx i *3&y therefore be willing to
^erpret toe ;.- i indicating more . se oi multiple
cutoii strategies under i mditions. Several researchers
have, however, cautioned against treating math models li--e these as
close enot ons to a conjunctive model to warrant such
an interpretation (eg,, Goldberg, 1971 j Simbaura, 1975). Clearly* more
rigorous tests relying more on introspective reports from subjects than
this study did are s&ry to sort out the precise interpretation.
The judgment task in this study was created so that certain
factors c a negative bias were present.
These inc options offering both positive and negative features,
options requiring personal investment, and & final commitment evaluation
text. results cion't indicate whether these are necessarv
factors e might specula- sough that a Decision ma'-er evaluating
opticus on a more tentative basis srve more information search?")
might react to tit coi ccentu&ting postive cata,
Cost, an >tions she jor cet< iflnt of the sirapli-
adopte
Subjects in tti traction stud]
,
practically speaking,
Avoid the extraneov:- se; those under high time pressure had little
incentive to proceed slowly (even though they set their own pace).
Even where are very important, decision makers may often find

nd total peace
t
in
.irse, av
otten l a»nts v
to be
It integrating
it have deve-
loped ind
An -on to: ; s what her people
- >n-
sistently ops press aents continue to accen-
ts Such peop ht
have the fa ects <Jic«*t. It isn't clear
isuruers or mai
ce in trying to
s it tr ideal condit to
=
actual
"correct
his prefem
became more
. ie use
s rati. aneral model building with-
tor the task environn

Table 1
R Frequencies fir Time Pressure
max
ait-; i Conditions
Data Usage
Model
Unbiased
Negative bias (KEG,)
Positive bias (r,
X
High
5
9
Time Pressure
Low
14
Undefined
15
13
12
S3fed
Negative bias
Positive bias (F<
Distract ion
Model lt€
3
?
| : OW
11
9
10

Table 2
Mean Multiple Correlations
Time Pressure Distraction Conditions
Data Usage
Model
Tine Presi
',
; •,. ;;.
h. Low Undefined
Negative bias (KEG )
Positive I as
1
,ss a
.6,22
« 3 /A
.703
,,721
.679
.701
690 ^550
696 jlOlII
719 .645
703
act i,ort
High ?-!'ode rate Low
Ujfbi.suad .720 .614
ve bias .6 .703 .619
. 6
'
,728 .606
146 ,714
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